Introduction
In the U.S. many major environmental regulations are enforced using a deterrenceframework: that is, regulations are enforced through unannounced compliance inspections and fines for any violations discovered during the course of those inspections. According to Gray and Shimshack (2011) , most policy-makers and scholars generally believe that effective pollution regulations require an enforcement regime that includes recurrent inspections and sanctions, and survey evidence suggests that a traditional regulatory structure with rigorous monitoring and enforcement is a primary motivator of facilities' environmental compliance decisions.
Numerous empirical studies covering a wide range of environmental regulations and regulated populations provide evidence that deterrence-based enforcement does increase compliance rates. For example, Gray and Deily (1996) and Gray and Shadbegian (2005) examine air pollution compliance for steel mills and pulp and paper mills in the U.S., respectively, and find that both inspections and enforcement actions have a statistically significant positive impact on compliance. Looking at compliance with U.S. water regulations, Earnhart (2004) and Glicksman and Earnhart (2007) similarly find that inspections and sanctions deter violations at water treatment plants and chemical facilities, respectively. Stafford (2002) shows that compliance inspections and penalties for violations have a significant deterrent effect on violations at facilities subject to hazardous waste regulations. 1
Most theoretical models of deterrence-based enforcement assume that compliance inspections are probabilistic -that is, a regulated entity knows the likelihood that compliance inspection may occur, but not whether one is or is not going to occur with certainty during any particular period. If compliance inspections are completely predictable, regulated entities would only comply when an inspection was going to occur.
By making inspections probabilistic, regulators can deter more violations using fewer resources because as long as the expected cost of violation -that is, the probability of an inspection times the sanction for a violation -exceeds the cost of compliance, facilities will comply.
In practice, however, it is not clear whether compliance inspections really are unpredictable. For example, it is reasonable to think that the probability that a facility is inspected may depend on how long it has been since the last inspection, particularly if a regulatory agency's charge is to inspect each facility at least once every two years. 2 If the timing of a compliance inspection depends on the length of time since the last inspection, facilities may be able to roughly predict when a compliance inspection will occur and adjust their compliance decisions accordingly, decreasing the deterrent effect of the inspection.
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the timing of environmental compliance inspections and determine the extent to which such inspections can be predicted. More specifically, this paper focuses on modeling the timing of compliance inspections conducted at hazardous waste generators using data on individual inspections over an eleven-year time period. If compliance inspections have become predictable, policymakers looking to increase environmental compliance may find it effective to redesign their monitoring strategy.
A secondary objective of this paper is to determine the extent to which using detailed information on individual inspections can improve empirical predictions of the timing of inspections. Many empirical analyses of enforcement and compliance need to estimate the likelihood of an inspection or the number of inspections for a given time period. For the most part, such studies estimate inspections for a particular time period based on aggregated data (e.g., monthly or annual inspections). However, it may be the case that using detailed information on individual inspections can improve empirical predictions of the likelihood and number of inspections.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis and discusses the related literature. Section 3 discusses the institutional setting for the analysis, namely the inspection regime for EPA's 2 For example, Section 3007 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requires that EPA or an authorized state conduct a program to "thoroughly inspect" every hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility "no less often than every two years" (42 U.S.C. § 6927).
hazardous waste program. Section 4 presents the econometric methodology while Section 5 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 6 presents the results of the duration models and Section 7 compares the duration results to other more common models of inspections. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Theoretical Framework and Related Literature
The deterrence approach to environmental regulation is based on Becker's (1968) seminal paper on the economics of crime, which assumes that individuals are rational, and will commit a crime whenever the expected benefit of the crime to the individual is greater than the expected cost of the crime to the individual. To deter crimes, the government can increase the expected cost of crime either by increasing the likelihood that a crime is detected or the punishment associated with a crime. Becker's initial model has spawned a large literature on the economics of crime as well as a literature on regulatory enforcement that starts with the same basic assumption that violators make decisions based on a rational comparison of costs. 3 Russell, Harrington, and Vaughn (1986) were one of the first to take the general models on the economics of crime and explicitly apply them to environmental regulation.
In the context of environmental regulations, if policy makers want to deter environmental violations they can either increase the likelihood that a violation is detected or increase the sanctions associated with detected violations. Over the last several decades many additional models of environmental compliance and enforcement have been built on this "rational polluter" framework, extending the basic model by allowing for complexities such as imperfect information, self-reporting, and principal-agent relationships, to name a few.
While the majority of these extensions assume a static setting, there are several papers that have presented dynamic models on enforcement and compliance. 4 One of the most influential of these models is Harrington's (1988) targeted enforcement model which uses changes in future inspection activity to motivate current compliance and shows that such a regime can maintain a higher level of compliance than can be obtained through more traditional, non-targeted enforcement. Harrington's model has been extended theoretically by a number of papers (see, for example, Harford and Harrington (1991) , Raymond (1999 ), Friesen (2003 ) and has also been the focus of a number of empirical studies (see for example, Helland (1998) , Nyborg and Telle (2006), and Stafford (2007) ).
While both the theoretical targeting models and the empirical tests of such models have explicitly examined the relationship between past and future compliance and enforcement, the models and estimates have used a series of discrete time periods such as months or years rather than looking at inspections continuously across time. For example, most empirical studies of enforcement estimate the likelihood of an inspection for a given time period (or in some cases the number of inspections for a given time period) choosing the time period for the analysis based on the type of data available. There is only one study other than this one that focuses explicitly on inspection timing, Rousseau (2007) . In that This paper differs from that of Rousseau in two primary ways. First, and most obvious, this paper looks at U.S. hazardous waste inspections across a wide range of industries as opposed to Flemish environmental inspections at textile plants across a variety of media (e.g., water pollution, air pollution, toxic substances). Second, this paper uses multiple different duration analyses in order to assess how well different duration models predict inspections. Moreover, it compares the predictions of the duration models to the predictions of more commonly used empirical models to determine whether using additional data on individual inspections provides a more accurate estimate of inspection probability than what can be achieved using aggregate data.
Institutional Setting
Because environmental regulation in the U. S. 307, 322-24 (1978) ), business owners and operators have an expectation of privacy against unreasonable administrative searches of their commercial property and warrantless searches cannot generally be conducted. However, there is an exception for "pervasively regulated businesses" subject to "longstanding governmental regulation." Additionally, probable cause for obtaining a warrant can be established by showing that the entity is being inspected according to a neutral inspection regime. In practice, few entities challenge EPA inspections without warrants (Steinway, 2009 
Econometric Methodology
As mentioned in the introduction, most empirical analyses of environmental enforcement use aggregated data (e.g., annual, quarterly, or monthly) to estimate the probability that a facility is inspected during a particular time period or the number of inspections that occur during a that time period. In contrast, this analysis uses data on individual inspections to estimate the length of time between regulatory inspections and the likelihood that a facility that has not been inspected for a given number of days will be inspected the following day. This paper uses a variety of survival or duration models to examine how various explanatory variables affect the "survival" time of subjects in the analysis or the "duration" as a particular type of "spell". 12 To conduct a survival or duration analysis one must first identify the universe that one wants to examine and then observe the times at which facilities enter and exit a particular spell. With this information, one can conduct a variety of different analyses to analyze the duration of spells and the ways in which various factors influence the duration. Alternatively one can examine the probability of exiting a spell conditional on having survived for a particular length of time. This probability is known as the hazard rate or hazard function.
Survival models all share the same basic setup. Let T be a non-negative random variable representing the duration of a spell for a particular subject. Then T has an associated density function f(t) and a cumulative distribution function F(t) where t is a realization of T. The probability that the spell length is t or longer is given by the survivor function:
The probability that one who has survived up to t exits a spell at t (the hazard function) is:
If (t) is increasing in t, the spell exhibits positive duration dependence. That is, the longer the spell, the higher the probability that one will exit from the spell. One would likely see positive duration dependence if facilities had to be inspected with a particular frequency, e.g. once every two years. The longer the time since the last inspection, the higher the probability of inspection will be. Alternatively, one might see negative duration dependence if the agency engaged in inspection targeting where some facilities were inspected with a high frequency and some inspected with a low frequency. Finally, spells may not exhibit duration dependence if the probability of inspection is constant across time.
The length of a particular spell, t, can be written as a function of a vector of explanatory variables x and an error term :
Then the hazard function can be written as:
where the function g() depends on the distributional assumptions one makes about  j .
Similarly, the survivor function can be expressed as
There are two general approaches for incorporating explanatory variables into the analysis, semi-parametric and parametric. 13 The most common semi-parametric model is the Cox proportional hazard model, which assumes that the hazard rate for an individual subject j can be expressed as:
where  0 (t) is a baseline hazard function common to all subjects. The model is then estimated using a partial likelihood estimator that does not require that the baseline hazard be estimated. 14 The explanatory variables in this model shift the hazard function multiplicatively and the ratio of any two subjects' hazard rates at a given point in time is constant as long as the covariates do not change over time. One advantage of this model is that it allows one to incorporate explanatory variables into the model but does not require one to make assumptions about the baseline hazard model that, if wrong, could result in misleading results. The disadvantage is that there is a loss in efficiency and if one knew the functional form for the baseline hazard one could obtain better estimates of the coefficients. Additionally while one does not have to make assumptions about the baseline hazard, one must assume that all subjects have the same baseline hazard, which could also result in misleading conclusions if the assumption is not correct. To control for multiple spells at individual facilities, the errors can be clustered by facility.
By making an initial assumption about the distribution of the hazard function, parametric models can use the data on spells more efficiently than the Cox model, assuming the distribution is specified correctly. There are a number of commonly used parametric models. The Exponential model is the simplest one as it assumes that the baseline hazard rate is constant, which implies that the underlying cumulative distribution function of the length of spells has an exponential distribution. The Weibull model assumes that the length of spells has a Weibull distribution, which results in a baseline hazard function that can be written as:
data were statistically significant. Thus the explanatory variables used in the model are important in predicting the duration of spells. 14 Cox (1972) presents the partial likelihood estimator where  and  are non-negative parameters of the model that that will also be estimated.
When  equals 1 the Weibull model reduces to the exponential model with a constant hazard rate equal to . If  is greater (less) than one, the hazard rate exhibits positive (negative) duration dependence. Note that in this model, the hazard rate is either monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing or constant. The Gompertz model also allows for a monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard rate, but unlike the Weibull model, the baseline hazard changes exponentially with time:
Note that this model reduces to the exponential model if  equals 0. The Log-Logistic model allows for a baseline hazard rate that can both increase and decrease. In this model, the baseline hazard rate is expressed as:
When  is less than one, the hazard rate increases up to a certain point in time and then decreases. When  is greater than or equal to one the hazard rate is monotonically decreasing. In all of these models, the explanatory variables serve to shift the hazard function. As with the Cox model, to control for multiple spells at individual facilities, errors are clustered by facility.
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) provides a method for determining which of these models provides the best fit. The AIC compares log-likelihoods of the models, adjusting for the number of parameters being fitted. For the parametric survival models, the AIC is defined as:
, (10) where k is the number of explanatory variables and c is the number of model-specific distributional parameters. Thus the AIC captures the trade-off between the complexity of the model and the goodness of fit of the model with a lower AIC indicating a better fit.
Description of the Data

Data Sources
Data on facilities subject to RCRA regulation comes from two primary sources, both of which are publicly available on EPA's website: the RCRAInfo database and the Biennial Reporting System (BRS). RCRAInfo contains information on all facilities that are or have been regulated under RCRA Subtitle C, i.e., facilities subject to RCRA hazardous waste regulations. The dataset contains information on facility characteristics, including facility status and regulated activities, and is updated periodically. The dataset also includes information on all inspections and enforcement actions at RCRA regulated facilities. The BRS contains data collected biennially (for odd years) on the generation and management of hazardous waste by facilities.
Universe for Analysis
This analysis considers all inspections that occurred between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2010. During this eleven-year time period, 314,776 RCRA inspections were conducted at 90,252 unique facilities. This represents about 12 percent of the over 760,000 facilities in the RCRAInfo database. While the low percentage of facilities that are inspected is partly due to the fact that a number of facilities in the database are inactive, it is also the case that many facilities regulated under RCRA are rarely inspected. In particular, of the over 300,000 facilities identified as conditionally exempt hazardous waste generators, only about a quarter were inspected during the 2000 to 2010 period. 15 Since the goal of this paper is to better understand the timing of inspections, the study focuses on those facilities that are likely to be inspected with some frequency: large quantity generators (LQGs) and facilities that store, treat, or dispose hazardous waste (TSDFs). 16 To ensure that the facilities in the analysis are actively regulated for the entire period of the analysis, the analysis is limited to facilities that consistently reported to the The primary inspection types were then used to identify compliance inspections for the purposes of this analysis. In particular, inspections whose primary type is a facility selfdisclosure, compliance assistance visit, case development inspection, or financial or nonfinancial record review were excluded from the analysis. 19 When these inspections are excluded, there are 43,559 compliance inspections in the initial dataset.
As discussed in Section 4, the unit of observation for a duration analysis is the spell between inspections, not the inspection itself. The snapspan and stset commands in Stata 16 A large quantity generator is any facility that generates more than 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) of hazardous waste per calendar month, or more than 1 kg (2.2 lb) of acutely hazardous waste per calendar month. 17 Since biennial reports are filed only for the odd years, information from the 1999 reporting cycle is used to infer that a facility was active in 2000 and from the 2009 cycle to infer that a facility was active in 2010. 18 Details on the hierarchies provided upon request. 19 Most of these excluded inspections represent a small percentage of total inspections. Financial and non-financial record reviews represent about 20 percent of all inspections, but are excluded because they are not field inspections.
were used to convert the inspection data to spell observations that can be used to conduct the duration analysis. The analysis includes spells that are both left-and right-censored, that is spells that begin before the period of the analysis but end during the analysis and spells that begin during the period of the analysis but end after the period of the analysis. Manufacturing is equal to 1 if the facility's primary NAICS is 31 through 33. Because federal and state operated facilities are supposed to be inspected at least once a year according to RCRA guidance, one would expect a positive coefficient on Public Administration but there are no prior expectations as to the signs on the other two variables.
The remaining facility characteristics do depend on the date on which the spell starts but they do not vary across the spell itself. Tons Generated, Tons Managed, and Tons
Received from Off-Site measure the tons generated, managed, and received from off-site, respectively, in the year prior to the spell's start date. Since BRS data is only reported in 
Results of the Duration Models
Cox Proportional Hazard Results
The results of the Cox proportional hazard model are presented in Table 3 . To control for multiple spells at the same facility, robust standard errors clustered by facility were estimated. As discussed in Section 4, the Cox proportional hazard model allows explanatory variables to multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard function without requiring one to specify a particular function for that baseline hazard. Figure 1 presents the estimated baseline hazard, which was estimated using non-parametric methods. Note that the hazard function initially increases, then decreases before increasing once again. Recall that an increasing hazard function is consistent with positive duration dependence while a decreasing hazard function shows negative duration dependence.
The coefficients for five of the six inspection types are significant. The four positive and significant coefficients indicate that if the purpose for the inspection that started the spell was a focused inspection, an O&M inspection, a groundwater inspection, or a corrective action evaluation the hazard rate is higher and thus the duration of the spell shorter than the duration if the inspection that ended the spell was a standard compliance evaluation. For compliance schedule evaluations, the negative and significant coefficient indicates a longer standard compliance evaluation. Three of the six inspector types also have significant coefficients. Thus if the federal EPA or one of its contractors leads the inspection that starts the spell, the duration is longer than if the state leads the inspection.
However, if the state has oversight but does not lead, the duration is shorter than if the inspection is led by the standard state regulators. If the inspection that begins the spell is caused by a citizen complaint, the time to the next inspection is longer, as shown by the negative and significant coefficient on Citizen Complaint, perhaps because inspections prompted by citizen complaints are more thorough than standard inspections.
Turning now to the facility-level variables, the positive and significant coefficients on TSDF and Commercial TSDF indicate that the hazard rate is higher for facilities that store, treat, or dispose waste than for generators that do not and thus the time between inspections is shorter. Facilities that are regulated under other EPA programs in addition to RCRA -i.e., Multimedia Facilities -also have a higher hazard ratio than facilities that are only regulated under RCRA. This could be due to the fact that multimedia facilities are usually more complex than single media facilities and thus pose a higher potential threat to human health and the environment. Note that both Waste Management and Public Administration also have positive and significant coefficients. The first result is consistent with regulators being more likely to inspect facilities for whom waste management is their primary activity rather than facilities the generate hazardous waste as a by-product of their primary activity. The positive coefficient on Public Administration is consistent with EPA's policy that state and federal facilities be inspected every year. Whether or not a facility is a
Manufacturing facility does not appear to have a significant effect on spell duration.
In terms of the time-specific facility variables, all three of the quantity variables have positive and significant coefficients indicating that the larger a facility is, the shorter the time between inspections. This is consistent with inspectors prioritizing inspections at facilities with larger potential impacts on the environment. While the coefficients on both targeting facilities with poor compliance records and inspecting them with a higher frequency than generally compliant facilities -and are similar to Rousseau's (2007) findings for Flemish textile plants. As discussed in Section 4, by making an initial assumption about the distribution of the hazard function, parametric models can use the data on spells more efficiently than semi-parametric models if the distribution is specified correctly. This study considers four commonly used parametric models: Exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, and Log-Logistic. For all four models, the models include the same explanatory variables that were used in the Cox model presented in Table 2 and estimate robust standard errors clustered by facility. Table 4 . 24 The results are qualitatively very similar to the results presented in Table 2 . There are only three significant changes. First, the coefficient on State Oversight is not significant in the Exponential model, although it was in the Cox model. However, the coefficient is consistently positive. Second, the coefficients on Prior 5 Year Inspections and State
Violations are both significant in the Exponential model although neither was in the Cox model. In these cases as well, the signs of the coefficients are the same across the two models. Finally, note that the Exponential model includes a constant term although the Cox model does not. In the Cox model, the baseline hazard model is not estimated directly and thus there is no need to fit a constant term. In the Exponential model, the baseline hazard is estimated to be:
where  is the constant terms estimated by the model. Thus the baseline hazard in this model is e -5.67 0.003, or a 3 in 1000 chance of an inspection each day, regardless of the number of days that have passed since the last inspection.
While the Exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz model are usually expressed in terms of the hazard rate, the Log-Logistic model is most easily interpreted an accelerated timefailure model where:
and u j is assumed to follow a logistic distribution. 25 The estimated coefficients have to be interpreted differently in this model -positive coefficients indicate a longer spell duration while negative coefficients indicate a shorter one. (Recall that the coefficients presented in Tables 3 and 4 change the hazard rate and thus a positive coefficient indicates a higher hazard rate and a shorter spell.) Table 5 presents the results of the Log-Logistic Model. Allowing for the different interpretations of the coefficients between the Exponential results and the Log-Logistic results, there is one primary difference as well as a number of less significant differences.
The most significant difference in the Log-Logistic estimation is that the coefficient on Tons Generated is positive and significant indicating that facilities that generate more waste have a longer time between inspections. This result is contrary to the positive and significant coefficient on Tons Generated in the Exponential regression, which indicates that facilities that generate more waste have a shorter time between inspections. The remaining differences between the two models include coefficients that are significant in the Log- Given the significant differences between the results for the Exponential/Weibull/ Gompertz models compared to the Log-Logistic, one can use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to determine which model is preferable. As discussed at the end of section 4, the AIC captures the trade-off between the complexity of the model and the goodness of fit of the model with a lower AIC indicating a better fit. As shown in Table 6 , the Exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz models have virtually the same AIC and all have a much lower AIC than the Log-Logistic. Since the Exponential model is very straightforward and performs almost as well as the more complicated Weibull and Gompertz models, the Exponential model is used for the next stage of the analysis.
To examine how well the Exponential model predicts inspections, the median predicted spell length for each observation in the duration database is calculated using the estimated parameters of the Exponential model presented in Table 4 . The median predicted spell length is the 50 th percentile of the survivor function from zero to infinity given each observation's explanatory variables and the estimated model parameters. Figure 2 shows the median predicted spell length plotted against the actual spell length with the dark line indicating the 45-degree line. Note that the Exponential model is not particularly good at predicting relatively long spells, and that the difference between the actual and predicted spells is often well over a year. This point is demonstrated more explicitly in Figure 3 , which provides a frequency distribution of the difference between the actual and median predicted spell length. Of the almost 45,000 spells in the analysis, for around 15,000 spells the difference between the actual and the predicted mean spell length is over a year. About fifteen percent of spells are over-estimated by six or more months while over thirty percent of spells are under-estimated by six or more months. Thus while the Exponential model is among the best of the duration models for predicting compliance inspections, there is still a considerable amount of uncertainty about the timing of compliance inspections. Using the Exponential model, it would certainly be difficult to predict within a short time frame (one or two months) when a compliance inspection is likely to occur.
Comparison of Duration Model to Other Inspection Models
Even though the Exponential model does not accurately predict a significant percentage of inspections, it does take into account a significant amount of data on individual inspections. Thus it might be the case that the Exponential model is a better predictor of aggregate inspections than more commonly used models of regulatory inspections. As discussed in the introduction, most empirical analyses of enforcement and compliance generally estimate the likelihood of an inspection for a given time period or the number of inspections for a given time period, with the time period selected based on the type of data available. For RCRA, the most obvious time period is a year since data on waste generation and management is reported annually. To compare the predictions of the Exponential model to annual inspection models, the median predicted spell length was used to create a database of predicted inspection dates that were then aggregated by year to create a count of the number of predicted inspections in each calendar year. Figure 4 plots the predicted inspections using the Exponential median compared to the actual inspections that take place each year. While there are some outliers, note that the model does a pretty good job of predicting the number of annual inspections across the entire support and is particularly accurate as the number of inspections per year increases.
For comparison purposes, a Poisson count model was used to estimate the annual number of inspections conducted at regulated entities. 26 The database for this analysis contains the annual inspections conducted at each of the 6,382 regulated entities included in the Exponential analysis for each of the eleven years in the study period for a total of 70,202 entity-year observations. 27 For explanatory variables, the model includes all of the facility-specific and state-specific variables used in the exponential analysis, but since the 26 The Poisson regression, unlike a standard OLS regression, takes into account the fact that the number of inspections is a count variable, i.e, a non-negative integer. 27 While there were 6,430 entities in the initial database, recall that the Exponential model uses state-specific data, and thus 48 entities in DC, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands were dropped from the analysis.
analysis is an annual one, none of the spell-specific variables are included. 28 The results of the regression are presented in Table 7 . Figure 5 shows the predicted number of inspections from the Poisson model plotted against the actual inspections that take place each year. Comparing to Figure 5 to Figure 4 , note that the Poisson model appears to under-predict the number of inspections when the actual count is below 40 and overpredict the number when the actual count is 50 or more.
To better compare these two models, Table 8 Because many inspection models examine not the number of inspections, but rather whether any inspections are conducted over a certain period, a Probit analysis was conducted to estimate the probability that at least one inspection took place in a calendar year. Table 9 presents the results of this analysis. The same facility-specific and statespecific explanatory variables are used in this analysis as in the analysis presented in Table   8 , but the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if any inspection occurred at the regulated entity in a given year. To compare the results of the Probit model to the Exponential model, 
Conclusions
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the timing of environmental compliance inspections and determine the extent to which such inspections can be predicted. The analysis considered a number of different duration models that use information on individual inspections, facility characteristics, and state factors to predict the timing of compliance inspections. Of the models considered, the Exponential model provides the best balance in terms of the explanatory power of the model and the simplicity of the model. However, even when one uses detailed information about individual inspections and facility characteristics to predict inspection dates, the Exponential model is not able to accurately predict a significant percentage of inspections.
Thus there remains significant uncertainty about the likely timing compliance inspections in the RCRA program, and the assumption that such inspections are probabilistic appears to be valid.
A secondary objective of this paper is to determine the extent to which using 
